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The allocation of a >pecific weapon system type to an acquire target is 
t ~n important tactical decision in the fire-support process. Accordingly, the 
determination of optimal {or even good) firc?-distribution strategfos for support-
tt ing weapon systems is a major problem of milita1:y operations research. The 
problem is of interest to the militaty tactician so that he may haVt\ a clearer 
understanding of the circumstances unde~ which a supporting weapon system (such 
as artillery) should engage the enemy's primary weapon system {i.e. infantry) 
and when it should engage the enemy's supporting weapon systems. 
!n this paper we will examine the dependence of optimal time-se~uential 
fire-support strategies on the form of the combat attrition mode.1.. PrE!Vious 
work by Weiss [38] and Kawara [22] suggests that an optimal fire-support strategy 
consists in always concc-ntrat1ng all fi!'e on one enemy l:arget type (although 
this target type may change over ti111e). We will consider a differet.tial game 
with slightly different combat dynam1cs than the fire-support differential game 
recently considered by Kawara [22] and show that optimal fire-support strate-
gies quite different in structure than those obtainP.d by him may arise. }lore-
over, the solution to the problem which we consider in this paper involves a 
solution phenomenon not previously :n~ountered in a Lanchester-type differential 
game:ttt the dual (0r: adjoint) variables may be discontinuous across a manifold 
of discontinuity fo~ both players' strategie3. 
Fire-support operations {as are any combat operations) are a complex 
random process {see (26]). We will nevertheless consider a si,n1,~lfied deternainistic 
tSce pp. I-33 to I-43 ot [26] fo= a further discussion. 
ttSee (38] fo-:- a brief discussion of the distinction between a "primary" weapon 
system (or infantry) and n "supportinr,'' wec1pon sy:.3tem. 
tttWe rnfer to a differential game as being a Lanchestc1-typl' diffor1~ntl<1i game 
when the systein dynamics c11e dcscribeJ by L..incliC'ster-typli C'quations of warfare 
(RCC [ 34]) • 
r 
' ' .•. 
Lanchester-type model in order to develop in3ights into the structure of o'>tirnnl 
time-sequential fire-support strategies. H.K. Weiss [38] has ernph.asi1.ed that 
such a model of an idealized combat situation is particularly valuable when it 
leads to a clearer understanding of signifir.ant relationships which would tend 
to be obscured in a more complex model. 
The problem of determining an appropriate mixture of tactical and strategic 
forces (another aspect of the optimal fire-support strategy problem) was exten-
sively debated by experts during World War II. Some analysis details may be 
found in the classic book by Morse and Kimball (see pp. 73-77 of [27)). The 
problem was studied at RAND in the late 1940's and early 1950 1s (see [16)) and 
elsewhere (see [1]). It would probably not be too far-fetched to claim that 
this problem stimulated early research on both dynandc programming (see [2]) and 
also differential games (see [16], [20]). Today the problem of determining 
optimal air-war strategies is being ex.:ensively studied by a number of organiza-
tions (r,c:i::, for example, [17], [25], [29], [361), An idealized version of A. Mengel 's 
problem (see [16]) appears in Isaacs' book as the "War of Attrition and Attack" 
(see pp. 96-105 of (21]). Discrete-time versions of this pr0blem of determining 
optimal "air-war" strategi:''3 have been considered by a number of workers as 
time-sequential combat gamt-.:: [5], [6], (15) (see also [7], [13)). A related 
problem has bPen considered by Weiss iJ3] (see also [37}), who studied the optimal 
t selection of targets for 0ngagement by a supporting weapon system. More recently, 
Ki~ara [22) has studied optimal time-sequential strategies for supportint weapon 
systems in an attack scenario versiou of Weiss' problem. Other recent work h~s 
considered various conceptual and computatlon.:il nspects of time-sequential 
combat names [28], [29], [30]. 
tSel' [331, howevt·r, 10r ,1 _i1wt::licatic111 u1 th•' or~tin,:tli~y, 1 strategies givt•n 




Since our work here may be considered to be an elaborati~n upon and 
extension of Kaw3ra's fire-support differential game {22), we will review 
his main results and relate our work here to them. Kawara [22] considers com-
bat between two heterogeneous forces, eacl1 compoeed of infantry (the primary 
weapon system) and artillery (the s•1ppor~ing weapon ,.ystem). The time-sequential 
decision problem is to determine each side's optiU1SL strategy for distributing 
its supporting weapon system's fire over enemy target types according to the 
criterion of the infantry force ratio at the prescribed-duration attack's end. 
t Kawara concludes that each siJe's optimal strategy is to always concentrate all 
supporting fire on the enemy's supporting weapon system (counter-battery fire) 
during the early stages of battle (if the total prescri.bed length of battle is 
long enough) and then lat2r to switch to concentration of all fj_re on the enemy's 
infantry. He states that this switching time "does not depend on the current 
strength of either &ide but only on the effectivenesses of both sides' supporting 
units" (seep. 951 of [22]). Moreover, an optimal strategy has the property of 
always requiring concentration of all supporting fire on enemy infantry during 
the final stages of battle. 
Thus, Kawara concludes that for his model the optimal fire-support 
strategies do not depend on force levels, However, this is only true provided 
that the appropriate side's (in Kawara's numerical example, the defender) 
supporti.ng weapon system is not reduced to a zero force level before a critical 
time.tt Let us as~ume, therefore, that neither side's supporting weapon system 
tKawara does not determine the optimality of extremal strntegies determined for 
his problem (i.e. show that sufficient conditions of optimality are satjsfied 
(see [4])), We use the work extremal to denote a traje~tory on whicl1 the 
necessary conditionn are satisfied. 





on p, 949 of [22] and its plot in Figure 4 of 
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can be reduced to a zero force level.t For this condition the optimal fire-
support strategies fil force-level independent and may be expressed solely in 
~erms vF "titile-to-go" in the prescribed duration battle. The purpose of this 
paper is to sh~w that a tactically realistic variation in the attrition equations 
leads to a problem with force-level dependent optimal fire-support strategies. 
This result has an important implication for tactical decisiryn making: opti~al 
time-sequential allocation of fire-support resources depends on not only initial 
intelligence estimates but also on a continuous monitoring of the evolution of 
the course of combat. 
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to illustrate the dependence of optimal 
fire-support strategies on the nature of Lanchester-type combat attrition equa-
tions (see [3~)). We consider a slight variation in Kawara's problem (i.e. 
different combat dyru:unics) for which the structure of the optimal strategy of 
one of the combatants is significantly different than that in the original prob-
lem [22]: the optimal strategy of one combatant depends directly upon the enemy's 
force levels and is no longer to always concent:4at\., all. fire on either the enemy's 
primary or supporting weapon system. Furthermore, w.~ will show that an optimal 
strategy in which a side divides the fire of its supporting weapon system between 
the enemy 1 $ primary (infantry) and supporting systems can only occur when the 
enemy's infantry has some fire effectiveness (in the sense of a non-zero Lan-
chester attrition-rate coefhcient) against his infantry. The optimal strategy 
of one s:lde to sometimes split its fire is very similar to that which occurs in 
a one-sitled (optimal control) problem previously considered by us [31J (see also 
[32]) for the optimal distribution of fire by a homogeneous force in combat 
against homogeneous forces. In [31] the enemy ccnsisted of two weapon sysl~m 
tinitial force levels and the known length of battle mr.y he ,;ufficirnc to 




types, each of which undergoes attrition at a rate proportional to the product 
' of the numbers of firers and targets (referred to, for convenience, as "linear-
law" attrition). l.n fact, this previous work of ours [31] was the motivation 
for our examination here of ether attrition structures in Kawara's problem. 
2. Kawara's Fire-Support Differential Ga~. 
Since Kawara 's fire-support differe,itial game is the point of departure 
for this paper, we will review the development of his model. The reader will 
find it convenient to compare the mathematical statement of K&wara's problem 
(1) with the fire-support differential game studied in this paper (2J in order 
to understand the dependence of optimal f!.re-support strategies on the mathe-
matical form of the attrition equations. 
Kawara (22] considers the attack of het.erogen~ous X forces against the 
static defense of heterogeneous Y forces, Both the X and Y forces are 
composed of two types of units: primary units (or infantry) and fire support 
units (or artillery). The X infantry (denoted as x
1
) launches an a 1:tack 
against the Y infantry (denoted as Y,), We consider that phase of the attack ... 
which may be called the "approach to contact." This is the time from the j nitia-
tion of the advance of the x1 forces towards the Y1 defensive position until 
the x1 forces actually make contact wHh the enemy infantry. It is assumed 
that this time is fixed and known to both sides and that infantry fire has 
negligible eftectiveness against the enemy'., infantry during this time. During 
this time the fire support units remain stationary, and each unit has the capa-
bility to deliver either "point-fire" counterbattery fire against enemy artillery 
or "area fire" against the enemy's infantry. 
It fa the objective of each side to attain the most favorable infantry 
i" force ratio po~siblc nt the end of the "approa~h to contJ.:t" at which Lime th0 








force separation between the opposing infantries is zero and artillery fires 
must be lif_ ?d from the enemy's infantry in order not to also kill friendly 
forces. Thus, the decision problem facing each commander is to determine the 
"best" distribution of artillery fire over time between enemy infantry and enemy 
artirery in order to maximize the quotient of friendly infantry (numerical) 
strength divided by enemy infantry strength at the end of the approach to con-
tact. This situation is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1. The reader is 
referred to Kawara's paper [22] for further details of the model's d~velopment. 
It should be pointed out that this model also applies to the case of an amphib-
ious landing and the determination of the optimal time-sequential allocation of 
the supporting fires of Naval ship guns. 
t MathE:mlatically, the problem may be stated as the following. 
{
xl(tf)} 
maximize minimize -(-) , 
U V Y1 tf 






cit = -valxly2' 
dx2 
dt = -(1-v)a2y2, 
dyl 
dt = -ub1Y{Y.2, 
dy2 
dt = -(1-u)b2x2 , 
with initial conditions 
0 ~· (t=O) = x and y (t=O) i i i for i = 1,2, 
(1) 
tWe use capital letters to d~note the closed-loop (or feedbnck) strategies (see 
[19)) of the players arid the c1-irrespornling 101.Jer cnsc letten; to denote the 
corresponding strat<.•1•,1r v,,d,1bles (sC'e [.!,]). A ,:;trntPgic v.1ri.ible is the 





















0 :s; U,"7 :ii. l 
where 
(Strategic Constra_nts), 
x1(t) is the number of X infantry (1.e. x1) at time t, 
x2(t) is tne number of X artillery (i.e. x2) at time t, 
st~ilarly for y1(t) and y 2(t), 
a 4 is a constant (Lanches~er) attrition-rate coefficient ... 
t 





sim11arly for bi' 
and 
u(v) is the fraction of X{Y) artillery fire directed at opposing 
infantry force::.. 
We: observe that for T < +» it follows from the battle· dynamics (1) that 
x
1
(t),y1(t) > 0 Vt£ [O,TJ. Thus, the only state va.riable inequality con-
straint~ (SVIC's) that must be considered are x?.,y 2 ~ 0. 
Kawara's results and conclusions [22) have bee~ discussed in Section 1 
above. 
3. Another Model for Optimal Fire-Suppor_; Allocation. 
In this paper we will study a vc:.-riation ,lf Kawara 's [22] fire-support 
<liff~cential gamG (1) just given. We wiJl see that for this problem ~he struc-
~~,e of the optimal fire-support strategy for the attacker has a ft1ndamentally 
different form than that for (1): the atlacker rust sometimes split his fire 
between the defender's primarv and supporting units in order to "avoid overkill." 
tSee (10] (also [8], [91) for methodolo~y ior th(' predic:..i,•:1 of such col'ffh·i,~nts 
from weapon system performance data, 
8 
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Furthemore, the :lclture of this split in an optimal stratcgv depends on the 
allocation of the defender's supporting fires. 
Let us again consider the attack of heterogeneous X forces against the 
static defense of heterogeneous Y forces. Each side is composed of primary 
units (or infantry) and fire support units (or artillery). The X infantry 
(denoted as x1) launches an attack against the position held by the Y infantry 
(denoted as Y1). Again, we will consider only the "app~<>ach to contact" phase 
of the battle. This pahse is the tima from the initiation of the advance of 
the x1 forces towards the Y1 defen&ive position until the x1 forces actually 
make contact with the enemy infant~~. It is assumed that this time is fixed 
and knovn to both sides. 
The x1 forces begin their advance against the Y1 forces from a dis-
tance and move towards the Y1 position using "cover and concealme~t." The 
objective of the x1 fo,:ces during the "approach to contact" is to close with 
the enemy position as rapidly as possible. Accordingly, small arms fire by the 
x1 forces is held at a minimum or firing is done 
11
0.1 the move" to facilitate 
their rapid movement. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to assuMe that the 
effectiveness of X's 
1 
fire "on the movi~" is negligible against Y 1• We assume, 
however, that the defensive Y1 fire causes attrition to the advancing x1 
forces at a rate proportional to the product of the numbers of firers and tar-
gets. Two possible justifications of this are as follows: because of the 
movement (and intermittent concealment) of the x1 forces and the distance 
involved, the Y
1 
defenders either ~l) fire into a constant (but moving) area 
without precise knowledge of the consequences of their fire or (2) when they do 
aim fire at x1 targets, the time to acq ,ire such a tar3et ls inver&ely propor-
tional to the density of x1 forces and much greater thnn rhe time to kill an 
9 
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acquirec. target. Under each of these sets of circumstances the assumed form 
of attrition has been hypotehsized to occur [11), [37). 
During the "approach to contact," the fire-support units remain stationary. 
Each unit has the capability to deliver counterbattery fire against enemy a=til-
lery or "area fire" against the enemy's infantry. In other words, we assume that 
each side's fire support units fire into the (constant) area containing the 
enemy's infantry without feedback as to the destructiveness of this fire. On 
the other hand, the effectiveness of counterbattery fire is not symmetric with 
respect to the two combatants. ~e assume that the defender has the capability 
(for example, through the use oi aerial observers) to sense when an enemy sup-
porting unit has been destroyed so that fire may be immediately shifted to a new 
targett and that fire is uniformly distributed over the survivors.tt The attacker, 
however, either (1) cines not have the capability to sense destruction of enemy 
fire support units acc:...cately (and hence distributes his fire uniformly over the 
(constant) area occupied by the defender's fire support units) or (2) if he does 
have adequate fire assessment capability, then target acquisition times (which 
are inversely proportional to the density of the enemy's fire support units) are 
much larger than the time to destroy an acquired target. This leads to a Y2 
attrition rate proportional to the product of the numbers of x2 firers and Y2 
targets [11), [37). 
t Alternatively, we may think that the attacker has massed so much artjllery that 
Xz targets are always easily acquired by Y2 once an X2 unit has been 
destroyed. Moreover, it will be assumed below that the initial Xz force 
level is sufficiently large to guarantee that it is never driven to zero. 
ttThis assumption is not essential for the structure of Xz's optimal fire sup-
port strategy. A similar structural result may be obtained when Xz'~ attrition 
is the same form as that for Yz. We have made the above assumption, moreover, 
so that the resultant attritJon model is most similnr to Kawara's [22] but yet 
yields significantly different results for the att~cker's fire support strat~~Y• 
10 
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It is the objcctiv~ of eil~h side to attain the most favorable infantry 
force ratio possible at the end of the "appro.-ch to contact" at which time the 
force separation between the opposing infantries is zero and artillery fires 
k'USt be lifted from the enemy's infantry's p~sition in order not to also kill 
friendly forces. Thus, the decision ?roblem facing each side is to determine the 
"best" distribution of artillery fire between enemy infantry and artillet'y over 
time in order to maximize the infantry force ratio at the tirr.e of contact betw~en 
the two infantry forces. This situation is shown di~grammatically in Figure 2. 
The above assumptions lead to the following differential gam~ with an 
attrition structure slightly different than that in Kawara's pro~lem (22]. 
{
xl(tf)) 
maximize minimize (t ) / , 
U V Y1 f 












d't° = -ublyl x2' 
dy2 
d't" = -(l-u)b2y2x2 , 
with initial conditions 
and for i = 1,2, 
(Statl• Variable Incqunli ty Const rain ts), 
0 :-:o u, v ~ l (Strnt~gic Vnrinbte lne1uality G,nstrnints), 
(2) 
































We observe that for T < -t- it follows from the battle dynamics (1) 
that x1(t), y1{t), and y2(t) > 0 Vt£ [0,TJ. Thus thP. only SVIC that must be 
c,.,nsidered is x
2 
-e 0. However, let us assume that the force level of the attacker's 
artillery is never reduced to zero. In other words. we consider the special case 
0 in ·,,hich x
2 
and T are such that x
2
(T) > 0 • 
4. Characterization of Optimal Fire-Distribution Strategies for the Supporting 
Weapon Systems. 
It snould be clear that in (2) above we have a11,a12,a2,b1 ,b2 > O. Although 
the results of A. Friedman (14) concerning existence of value do not apply directly 
to our fire-support differential game (2), they do apply to a suitably modifi~d 
dx2 version. If we were to conside1: a version of this problem with dt = -(1-v)a2y 2 + r 2 
where r
2 
> 0, then it may be shcm (see pp. 210-230 of (14)) that this "modified" 
differential game has val~e and that a saddle point exists in pure strPtegies (see 
pp. 2~:.-235 <lf (14]). We will now develop the basic necessary conditions of 
optimalitr for (2). 
~or x1 ,x2,y1,y2 > O, the Hamiltonian for (2) is given by l12] 
where we have adopted the following correspondence between state and adjoint 
variables: 
state variable dual_varinble 










with pl (T) 
1 (4) dt- = .. ax
1 
= allylpl + v*a12Y2P1 =f' 
yl 
dp2 au 
u*blylql + (l-u*)b2ylq2 wi.th p2(T) = 0, 





( 6) dt = - ay{ = allxlpl + u*blx?.ql = - (yi)2 ' 
dq2 c3H 
(1-v*)a2p2 + (l-u*)b2x2q2 with q2(T} = o. (7) -- = - - = v*a x p + d' ay2 12 1 1 
The results of Berkovi.:z [3] say that H, ,e.(t), and .s.(t) are continuous 
functions of time except possibly at manifolds of discontinuity of both U* and 
V* (sec Section 4.3 below). 
When x1,x2,y1 ,y2 > 0, the extremal strategic-variable pair, denoted 
as (u*,v*), is determined by the max-min princi~~2. Hence, we consider 
so that 
maximize minimize H(t.,~~•C..•$L•u,v), 
u*(t) = {: 
for S (t) > 0, 
u 
for S (t) < 0, 
u 
wl1ere the U-switching function, s ( t) ' u is givc>n by 
and 
-- j 01 v*(t) i 
for S ( !:) > 0, 
V 






where the V-switching function, 
It is readily shown that 
and 
s (t) t 
V 





We m~st further investigate the possibility of singular subarcs (see [1lj 
or Chapter 8 of (12)). Let us fucst show that it is imposs:fble to have a 
V-singular subarc. In other words, v*(t) must be O or 1 almost everywhere 
in time. The impossibility of a V-singular subarc is established by showing 
ds 
that dtv > 0 for all t e: [0,TJ. It is clear that 
(1-u*)S (t) ~ 0 for all t E [O,TJ. 
u 
Considering (13) &nd the fact that 
f 
xl 
q1(T)y1(T) = - f < 0, we see that 
(15) 
Y1 
whence follows the assertion via (14) . 
It is possible, however, to have a U-singular subarc on which 
3H ···-::. 0 ou 
(or, equivalently, S (t) = 0) for a finite interval of time. There are ~wo 
u 
cases to be considered: (1) v* = 1 and (2) v* = O. 
Wh(m v* = 1, it is readily computed that 
f 
-(~}) (a I 1 h ly 1-8 12b2y 2)' 
Y1 
15 
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.!!__ U-singular subarc with V* = 1 
(18) 
a (an) 
Consideri~g (16) and ll8), the requirement that dt a~ ~ 0 on a singular 
subarc on which :: = 0 for a finite interval of time yields the second cond!.-
tion for a U-singular subarc with V* = 1 
On a subarc on which 
hold we additionally 
the first and second coudi tions for a singular subarc 
d2 ;rn 
require t!1at W (a~) = 0 so that (17) yields the 
(19) 




Checking the generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition t [ 23], [ 21•] 
we find that on a subarc on which (18) and (19) hold we have 
f 
a { <l 2 (<m)} (xl) 2{ 2 -2 • a~ di! au ~ f (x2) · all(bl) Y1 + al2(b2J Y2f 
Y1 
> o. 
We may write the equation of the U-singular surf ace (see p. 683 of [ 31] as 
for v* = 1. 
i,ll i ' 1 · ' 1· • l. '1 R 1~ n nec·,':,sary c0m1t1C1n or npt1n1a 1tv. R. lsa:1cs [:>1 l gives an 











dt2u = -u*b1x2 dt~ + a2b2y2{-u*Su(t)+b2q2y2+p2x2[u*bi-(1-u*)b2]}, (23) 
so that the first an<i_~nd conditions for a U-singular sub,1rc with V* = 0 
are, respectively, (18) and 
f 
= a12b2Y2 + b2Y2(yt)<-sv(t)}. 
xl 
It should be noted (see [1~]) that the above si~gular surface exists in 
~ - I?., space. It is convenient to write 
b yf 
2 l {-S (t)} 
f V 
all bl xl 
for v* = O. 




The requirement th<-2t u* :;; 1 yields that on a lJ-singular subarc with V* =- 0 
we must have 
It is readily checked Lhat the gE•neralized Legendre-ClC'bsch condition is 
satisfied. 
(27) 
4. 3. Dis cont inui!_y--9.i._~djo i _!l_L Vn riab les Across Mnni fold nf Oiscont intd_!y of 
!~t~_!l:~!ld V*. 









From (20) and (26), we see that u*(T) must changei in general, <.!iscontin-
changes from 1 to O. Let us consider tlw totality u: trajectories on which 
this happens. The locus of points in the t,~x_- space for such simultan<'nus 
switches is then a manifold of discontinutty of both U* end V*. Across such 
a manifold the adjoint variables need not he continuous (sec> [3]). 
J.et tv = t/,t,.V dcnute the backwards time at which v*(t) changes 
from l to O. For future purposes, i.t will be convenient to consider a 
simultaneous switch with u* changj ng from the singular control b/ (h1 +h2) 
co 1. Then the manifold of discontinui.ty of both U* and V* is given by 
F(t,~V = t - T + Tv(~V = 0, 
and (29) 
G(y = allblyl - a12b2y2 = O. 
Across the manifold of discontinuity, we have 
T + T - oF oG 
lL (T) =}?.. (T) - p - - 0 ox 
, ax ~ ~ 
~1'<1!> T - clF i)G = ~ (T) - p - - 0 ·ax_ ' ax_ 
and 
H(t+) H(,: -) + p ilF oG = -- + 0 ' V V at dt 
or 
(30) 





(-q2 ( t ~)) 
V 
(-qz(T)) = + p --- - aal2b2 , ay 
2 
(32) 
(33) H(t+) = H(T-) + p. 
V V 
18 
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Considering (9) and ( U), it is readily shown thal 
and 





+ u*(T) = 1, 
V 
at 
V ay --·-2 2 ax
2 








5, Synth('sis of Extremal Str~ltl>_fil_c-V,.1riable Pair. 
OT 
V a --)a 
2 ax2 









of th<• time history of the <>xtremal strntcgic varial> le pair 
i· 
( u*, v*) from 
initial to tarminal time (see (21] and also [Jl]-[33]). Tite basic idea is 
to trace exltt.•mals backwards from the terminal manifold (where boundary con-
ditions for the adjoint va .. iables arc known) in sue~ a way to guarantee the 
satisfaction of the initial conditions. Thus, it is conveflh•nt to introduce 
the backwards time T defined by ( 2_8) • 
5.1. Extremal Transitions i11_Strategic VariabJ.es. 
It seems approprja.tc to examine what are the possible transitions (ot 
changes) in each strategic v«r:lablc 
as T increases). It has been shown 
as we work backwards 
as 
V 
above that dt < 0 
from the end (i.e. 
for all t (. [O,Tl. 
Considering the boundary conditions ( 4) and ( 5 ) for the adjoi.nt variablf's, 
it follows that S (T=O) > 0. Thus 
V 
v*(t) -- l o1 for O ::. t ::. t , V 
for t < t. 
V 
It will be convenient to refer to that phase of the planning horizon durin£ 
which v*(t) == 0 as V-Phase I 
which v*(t) == 1 as V-Phase II. 
(i.e. 0 st< T - t) and to that during 
V 
(39) 
Extremal transitions in u* for ln~reasing t as shown in Figure 3. 
Thus, this figure shows what changes we might expect to obf;erve in u* as 
we follow an extremal backward~ from the end of l~,e planning horizon al 
dS xf) 
t = 0. 








When u* = 0, then dot y 
2 
< 0. Ouring V-Phase I wh£"n 
S (t=O) = 
ll 
v* = 0, 
= (x!)<allblyl-al2b2y2) 
Y1 
+ b._y2S (T). 
L V 
During both phases, the singular 
subarc may be exited with ellh<'r u* = 0 0r u* = 1. Once ui~ hecom<.'S 0, 
it n•mnins this way. The above statC'nwnts will be further justified i,C'low. 







[i,-Jt-;] [1 - _q2y~) p2:>:2 for v* :: 0, 
( u = s f b2 ) 
lb1 +b2j for v* = 1. 











----------------· --- --~------------------------- -------- ------ --
5.2. Extrc•mal S~nthC'sis for_ t~ < tv. 
From tlu.> abc: vc we have 




u>~ ( T) = 1 for O ~ t ~ t , 
u 
where t is the smallest zero of the equation S (t=t ) = O. If the U-
u u u 
(40) 
(41) 
singular subarc is reached in V-Phasc! II (see Section /4.l. above), then let 
us denote the backwards switching time at which u* changes from 1 Lo 
as 1·*· u Cl~arly, it is necessary that for this singular 
subarc to appear jn the solution. Thus, in general, there arc two cases to 
be considered: 
(1) t* < t, 
U V 
and (2) 
In this paper we will consider only the former case, with the latter one follow-
ing along the same general lines of development. We therefore assume that a11 , 
* f f f f ~1~2-•_1?.1..?...E.2~ 1..!.....!2..L.1.1..,., __ a_n_d_..,_Y2_ are such that T < t , ---v We will give 
numeric~l results for this case below. Moreover, in all our numerical computa-
ti0ns we have only encountered this case. 
5.2.1. Extremals NC'ar Lhe Terminal Manifold. ---·--------- ------------· 
dS 
H.ecall ing (16), we SN' that u > 0 
c' ' 
(<O) if c1nd only if 
Y1 
-·· > (<) 
Yz 
Considering (!10), it is clC'ar thal S (T) 
u 




s (t) chnngc sign when Y1 may < -· --
u f "1 Ibl Yz 
The U-




is given, then 
to yield the value of 
{denoted as 






(Other results are given bt-low in Table J.) We denote the corresponding ratio 
f [Yi)* of to Yz* as q , 










y 2 , it follows that tu is 
the smallest root of the t~anscendcntal equation 
f f f 
( 
allyt) f 8 11yl blx2,:u 
bl - -f - - al2b2y2Tu + -f- e = 0. (43) 
x2 x2 
ai:u f f 
It may be shown that ar" > 0 where r = y/y
2
• This latter result is useful 
in proving the following: 
------ ------------- ----------1 THEORg~~:-;ss~1mc 
I 
that 
as long as 
t > t*. 
V U 
v*(t) = 1 
TI1cn, u*(t) = l 
f f 
for y! > (~)*. 
Y2 Y2 
on any <?>· :..rcmal 
PROOF: The proof is by contradiction. Let 
f (a) /ssume thnt we could h.:lve a switch in u*(t) (with v*(,) = 1) 
f yl > (y1)* I th d w a f1"nd T sucl1 thftt S 1 t=t) = 0 or f f . n o er wor s, c c n u " u, u 
with Y2 Yz 












:•tC,,· ,, ,«~;-;;,,-::,1:'!~r:+,rr,tx:?->'_-'"'-· ,,, ·:~ .. ~:: ;~~~~ ,., 






(b) Consider r = f = [
y 1) -!, 
-- + 
f 




1.'hcn it may be shown that aru > O. 
implies, however, that T > T* 
u u 
for 
(c) Observe that 
f 
f f blX2T 
Y/Y2 e 
Ju* = 1 
l v* = 1 
Hence, 
In particulnr 
~ r = r. 
for ~ r = r, 
3t 
u 
and s·Jch that 
vf * 0 
r= r ~) > • 
Y2 
dS 
since then T (r=~) > T*. 
u u 
It has been shown above that dT ~ > 0 for 
dS 
u 
implies that dT (T::a'fu) > 0, and hence 
0 = S ( T =T ) > S ( T ) fo t' T ( ( T -o , T ) , 
u u u u u 





This last statement (46) is a contradiction to (44), and the theorem is 
proved. Q.E.D. 
Other results arc obtained in a similar fashion. 
5,2.2. Field Construction. 
For a given set of terminal values and 
f 
Yz an extremal 
may be traced backwards from the terminal manifold by a backwards integration 
of !:!i.:. state and adjoint equations combined with (8) and (10) (also (20) or 
(26)). By varying these terminal values the entire .f.!.£.lj~'xtremal~~ (S<.>c' 
p. 128 of (12]) may be obtained. 
fhe various types of extremals that may occur in the field of cxtr<'mals 
are shown in Figure 4. This figure is rcprcsent.'.'lt iv~ of all our numeric,11 
n•stilts for -r* < T (rH~l' S<"ction 5.2.3 IH'h1w). Perti1wnt information co11-
u V 
cerning each type of extremal i~ giv<'n in Tabll' I. 
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Figure 4. Identification of Various Types of EAtremals for Which Information 
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Tahfo I. ~xtrcmal Trajectorks for Fire Sur,eiort 
* 
lI { u*(t) = 1 
p • 
so· v*(t) = 1 
* 
Prob] em with T < T • 




T is the smallest positive root of 
u 




















1 * 1 ---- < T < ·--
f u f 
all.yl blx2 
* 1 T ..,_f, 
u 
blx2 
l * <-1---< T 
f u f • 
blx2 ullyl 
.!($hbtr<!.4ZLJ"'J!l lj@il2.. GlJ .c .. I. ..• J.4@.:J .. C:ll$ .. Qi$,¢. ... ,iJ.H$Jl.fU.- C 3 . -~AX.,.,~_,,.,_-·- Lil ;l 
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Table I. (cont.) - 1 I 
(concludeJ) l 
* PII Let S (t=T ). Also, on Wt:' have 























= yl e 
y
2
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Table I. (cont.) - 2 
II { u*(T) • b/ (b1 +b2) * * 2. Psi= for T :i>T ~t 
v•(t) • 1 u V 
• PII where TU is determined in 1. On SJ we have 
s Ct) .. 
u 0, 
* * T is the smallest positive root of S (t=r ) = 0, where 
V V V 






11 we have Sl 
• An upper bound on tv is given by 
(' 





-8 X (T -T ) } 2 u 
f .. 
-& )( (T-' l I 
2 ,, f 
C • 
J. Pu. u· 
{ u~(T) • 1 
v*(T) • 1 
for 
Table I. (cont.) - 3 
0,; T ~ t 
V 
With 
t is the smallest positive root of S (T•t) • O, where S (T) 
V V V V 
is given in 1. An upper bound on t v is given by 
It hu been shown that S (T) > O for O ,; t ~ T • The solutions to the 
U V 
state and adjoint equations are the same as those for P!! given above. 




{ u*(T) • 1 
v*(t} .. O 
for T Jot,; TI 
V U 




_!! (T) .. b2y2Sv(t) + f (allblyl(t)-al2b2y2). dt 
Y1 
I 
PAl we have 
with 
f 
y1(t) • y; exp{b1x;(t-Tv) + a
2bfy2 (t-tv)2}. 
dpl 
with p (T•T) • V d't • -•11Y1P1 1 V P1• 
dp2 
with p (t•t.). V d't • -blylql 2 V P2• 
vith 
We have not been able to devt>lop solutions in terms of "elementary" functions 








s. PII. 1.2· 
u*(t) • l 
{ v*(t) • 1 
- . ------•··-----------
Table I. (cont.) - 4 
for 
t is the smallest positive root of S (tct) • 0, where 
V V V 
f 
S (t). 5SLII +ab YSLillxl)j all + v v 2 l l f ) (b f)2 
Y1 lx2 
Again, an upper bound on tv is given by a12/(a2b1). It has been sho~n 
II II 
that Su(t) > 0 for tSL < T ~ Tv• Also, on PA2 we have 
and 
I i 30 
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Table I. {cont.) - 5 
6. 
l { u*(t) • 1 
for '- t '- t
1 p • t 
AZ• v*(t) • 0 V u 
Results are similar to those for 
I 
PAl above in 4. 
l u*(t) • 1 t 
s. tl 1. PAJ: { for l ,. t 
•1*(t) - 0 
V u 
for * -I t ,. t s t 
V U 
As usual, we have that S (t) < 0 for t > t. In order for a 
V V 
U-singular subarc to be possible for 
·-hold at t • t V 
* T ~ t the following condition must 
V 
•- * *- * blp2(tv )x2(tv) ~ b2(-q2(tv ))y2(tv). 
Also, on P~2 we havet 
dx1 
dt • 8 llxlyl with 
dx2 
d-r • 8 2y2 
dyl * 
d-r .. usb1x2Y1 
dy2 * 
d-r = (l-us>b2X2Y2 with 
and 
dpl 
d-r • -allylpl 
dp2 
d-r • -blylql 
tA further discussion of the contin11ity of lh~ adjoint v~riahles is to be found 
in Section 5,2.4. below. 
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Table I. (cont.) 
a:: 1 { u*(T) II 
PBl: for 0:;; "C 
:;; t with 
... 1 u v*(T) 









Y1 t~r -< f 
Y2 Y2 
It should be noted that 
i)T 
_J!> 0 ar • 
It may be shown that for 
* where the determination of t is u 
Tu(rl) < Tu(r2) for 
f 
rl < r2 (xl 
* t < t ' u u 
given in 1, We also have 
f held constant). and x2 
to the state and adjoint equations are the same as those for 
Let S (t=t) = Su 
V U v' 
u 






so given above. 
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Table I. (cont.) - 7 
for T ~ T ~ T 
U V 
It follows that for all T > t we have 
u 
y 




is given by 
S (T) 
V 
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Table I. (cont.) - 8 
II { u*(T) • O II 
11. PB3: for t 8T ~ T #. T v*(T) • 1 ~ V 
Again, an upper bound on Tv is given by a12/(a2b1). It may be shown that 
II II 
Su(T) < 0 for all T > TsL· Also, on PB3 we have 
34 
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Table I. (cont.) - 9 
12. 
I { u*('f) • 0 * 
i : fot T ~ "l' 
B4 v*(T) • 0 V 
' 1 
* It may be shown that S (t) < 0 and S {t) < 0 for all t > T • Also, 
U V V 
k v* 2a2 v• * (~ )2 - - y coth(-A(T-T )+B) 
2 b2 2 v 
b 
for _1 ( v*>2 > 1.: v* 2 x2 8 2" 2 ' 
b2 v* * b v~ 
x2(-r) • v* for .-1 { v*>2 x2 /{1 - - X (T-t )} 2 x2 = a2y2' 2 2 V 
/-
8
2 v* cx;*> 2 * 
1'2 v* v* 
tan{C(t-t )+D) fo:- -·- {x )2 < 8 2y 2 ' y - 2 2 b2 2 V 
b2 * v* 
f - ( V )2 or 2 x2 = a2y 2 , 
b2/ v* 23 2 v* where A • - {x ) 2 - - y 
2 2 b2 2 ' 
35 
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Table I. (cont.) - 10 
12. (concluded) 
and 
v* ) x2 
B = coth-l ~========= 









D = tan-l/t;•, :~ ) 






We have not been able to develop solutions in terms of "elementary" functions 











Table I. (concluded) - 11 
1 I u*(T) - 0 
PB2 and PB3: 
{ v*{T) 
for t ~T 
r. 0 V 
Results are similar to those for pl 
B4 above in 12. 
I { u*(T~ 
• 0 
I 
PBS: for TSL ~ T 
y,\' ( T) = 0 
Results are similar to those for PI 
B4 above in 12. 
I . 
u* (T) .. 1 
I I 
PA4° { v,'c(t) 
for TSL ~ T =. Tu 
- 0 
Results are similar to those fo~ I PAl ahove in 4. 
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5.2.3. Numerical Examples. 
A computer program to calculate numerical values for information given 
in Table I was written in FORTRAN for the IBM 360 computer.+ A plot.of the field 
of extremals (see Figures 5, 6, and 7 below) is generated by this program. The 
closed-form analytic results pref:ented in T,~ble I are used whenever possible. 
Approximate nu~erical solutions to transcendental equations (for the determination 
of, for example, * t, t, etc.) are developed by the well-known Newton-Raphson 
U V 
method. In tho~e ~ases for which closed-form solutions are not available to the 
state and adjoint equations, a st,•ndard fourth order Runge-Kut ta numerical inte-
gration method is used. A tima step, ~t, was used in these numerical integra-
tions which yielded agreement to the fifth place to the right of the decimal 
place in test cases in which the approximate numerical solution could be compared 
with the exact solution. 
Parameter SP.ts for the numeric~! exa1nples given in this paper are shown 
in Table II. For our problem (2) we may considei· time to be an additional state 
vari~ble so that the state space is five dimensional, i.e. the state variables 
are and Thus, unfortunately, we cannot graphically depict 
the field of extremal trajectories but must be satisfied with viewing "cross-
bection" plots of it. 
Table II. Parameter Sets Used to Generate Numerical 
Results Shown in Fi:~ures 5, 6, and 7. 
Parameter 
bl b2 
f f f 
Set all a12 a2 xl x2 Y2 
1_ 0.003 0.006 0.01 0.004 0.005 4.0 8.0 8.964 
2 0.003 0.006 0.01 0.004 0.005 4.0 8.0 11.597 
'I-The author would likt-· to tlt.111k Captain Jeffrey L. Ellis (lJ. S. Army) for d0i11:~ 
this work. Subsequent c,~mputational contributions were made hy Captain Roh(•rL 
J. Hill, III (U. S. Army). 
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I 
The most illuminating plot for gaining ir.sight into the structure of the 
optimal fire support strategies for (2) is that of extremal trajectories in 
terms of Y/Y2 versus backwards time, -r. This is shown for parameter set 
1 in Figure 5. The corresponding strategic variable values for X and Y 
(i.e. u* and v*) along each extremal are also given. Other plots have 
b~n considered, but they provide little, if any, additional insight. 
The most significant features of the field of extremals shown in Figure 
5 are the two U-sing~iaL· "surfaces": there is one in ~•X. - E.•1 space in 
V-pha~e I and one in x,-space in V-phase II. In each phase, X uses the 
* * stra.:egy U ""1 above the singular "surface" and the strategy U = 0 below it. 
Simila~ to our discussion in [32], the singular surfaces are present i~. che 
field of optimal trajectories so that the X artillery avoids "overkilling" 
f!it'•er Y1 or Y2• Thi8 insight is obvious when one, for e..<ample, considers 
ill 
x2 =b1Y1• 
'L'•IH, the r.:,te of destruction of Y1 per unit of X arti:.
1 ery decreases over 
tine as the Y
1 
force level decreases (see [31] and [32]). 
Results for parameter set 2 are shown in Figure 6. There is a void 
(seep. 169 and also p. 187 of [21]) in the field of extremals. This is because 
i; 
:l ra backwards time at the end -r of the u-singular subarc in V-phase II, we 
V 
woultl have *+ us(-r ) ,, (as given in Figure 3) equal to 1.054 if the adjoint 
variablee were continuous at 
situation. 
* '[ . 
V 
The following theorem further explains this 
'39 
· Figure 5. 
t 
V 
Backwards Time, t (minutes) 
t u 
Y1 
Plot of - versus Backwards Time, t, 
Y2 











Backwards Time, T (minutes) 
(t=T) 
Y1 
Void in Field of Extremals Shown in Plot of -
Y2 




-, .. ~,, , .. ---~---- ----- -- -- --
THEOREM 2: There can be no U-singular subarc beginning in 
backwards time at T: with a11b1y1 = a12b2y2 for 
blp2(T~)x2 + b2q2(T~)y2 < O. 








= a12b2y2, there is no discontinuity in the 
adjoint variables at T = T 
V 
(i.e. a = 0 in (37)). 
PROOF: Imnediate by (27) and (37). Q.E.D. 
Additionally, Theorem 3 gives the extremal transitions in X's strategy possible 
* from the U-singular surface in V-phase II as we work backwards from T. Thus, 
V 
* * since b1p2(Tv)x2 < b2(-q2(Tv))y2 for parameter set 2, a void would exist in 
the field of extremals if the adjoint variables were continuous at * T • 
V 
THEOREM): Assume that there is no discontinuity in the adjoint 





(Tv)x2 < b2(-q2(Tv))y 2, than we can only 






(Tv)x2 ~ b2(~q2(Tv))y1, then we can have 
{ (a) 0, 
u*(T) = l (b) (1-q2y/(p2x2)) • b/(b1+b 2), 
· (c) 1, 
for T t (T ,T +o) where o > O. 
V V 
*-PROOF: (a) When we are on the singular surface in V-pha~e II at Tv = Tv, 
then by (22) and (23) and the continuity of the dual variables we have 
+ 0 + 
S (T=T) = S (t=T) = 0, 




[; '._. ~ \ 
~ \ ... 
• 
where S u 
o o + + ( b 2 1 ( q 2Y 2) S (T~T) ~ab (L +b )p x y {u*(T )- -- 1 - --)} , 





(b) Considering a Taylor series expansion about T 
+ = T , 
V 
we have by 
the above for 
+ *+ 
T ~ T = T 
* where T E. (T ,r). 
V 
V V 
(c) When u*(T) = 0 
00 *+ 
S (T=T ) 
U V 





so that 3 o
1 
> 0 such that Su(T) < 0 for all -r E. (T ,-r +o1). V V 
(48) 
Thus, we 
can always have u* = 0 as we work backwatds in V-phase I from the U-singular 
subarc in V-phase II. 
IC * 
(d) Now let b1P2\•v>x2 ~ b2(-q2(•v))Y2• By (26), the u-singular 
control in V-phase I % = (l-q2y2/(p2x2)) •b2/(bl+b2) ~ l. Thus, the 
ti-singular subarc is possible. 
:':+ then 
00 *+ 
~ 0 by When u*(T ) = 1, S (T=T ) 
V U V 
(4 7). When inequality holds, it follows that 3 61 > 0 such that 
S (t) > 0 
u 
* 
Clearly, we cannot have u* = l if b1p2(tv)x2 < 
Q.E.D_. 
The same analysis as used in the proof of Theorem 3 applies on a 
U-singular subarc in V-phasc I when v* = O. As long as (27) holds, one 













5.2.4. Filling in a Void. 
w~ have emphasized that H, ~(t), and !].(t) arc continuous functions of 
time except possibly at manifolds of discontinuity of both U* and V* (see Section 
4.3 above). From Theorem 3 it follows that a void must exist in the field of 











At * 'v' moreover, v* changes (as we progress backwards in time) from 1 to 0 
and u* from b2/(b1
+b,) to a diffcre~t value. Thus, we have a manif0ld of 
discontinuity of both U* and V*. Moreover, considering results given above, 
it is readily shown that u*(T) remains for increasing T (i.e. backwards 
time) equal to zero once it changes to zero. TI1en from Theorems 2 and 3 it 












the dual variables must be 
discontinuous to fill in the void, and we must have u*(-r) = 1 for * I* T < T < T 
V U 
Furthermore, considering Figure 6 and considerations "in the large," the maui-
fold of discontinuity must lie on the V-transition surface. 
{
\.:*(t) = b/(b1+b 2), 
v*(t-) = 1 
V 
It remains to determine the function 
and 
T (x,v, V,.,, ,t,.., 
+ 
{ u*(t) = 1, 
v*(t+) = O. 
V 






may be computed, and the jumps in H, £, and i subsequently determined (sec 
( 30) through ( 33)). It shoul.~ be clear that it is impossible to explicitly 
determine T (x,v). However, by computation of five points on the V-transition 
V ,.. ,t,.., 
surface, the desired partial derivatives may be estimated by using linear 
approximations to the appropriate directional derivatives and solving a system 
of four linear equations in four unknowns. For parametc? set 2 (as the rcfc>rcncc 
case), this yi c]ded the follow inf', c>stimntcs 
L,./, 
-- -------- - ----------· -----
3T 
V -3 - ~ 0.0000, xl 
a-r 
V -a - = -0.295, 
x2 
h 
V r = -0.0331. Yz 
It is, therefore, convenient to re-write the jump conditions across 
the manifold of discontinuity of both U* an<l V*. 
(50) 
(51) 
where p nnd o ar~ related by (3E). In this case the jumps (37) and (38) 
in the switching functions simplify to 
and 
(53) 
*+ *+ Since v*(T ) = 0, we must have S (T ) s O so that (50) o~d (53) 
V V V 




:i_ are continuous at 




For o > 0, the condition that 
S (T*+. 
U V J 
--- > 0, a 
*+ 
u*(1 ' = 1 V . yields 
whE:re S c/+) is given by (52). Although it cannot in general be guaranteed 
U V 
that (54) will always hold when a void in the iield of extremals such as that 
shown in Figure 6 exists, it should be clear that it must if the problem (2) 
is to have a solution. The author conjectures that this is true. It is readily 
shown that when (54) holds, we have 
s c/+> > o, 
U V 
0 *+ 
f°J (T ) < 0, 
U V 
and (55) 
The appropriate value for a is determ~ned by "considerations in the 
large:" the structure of the entire f1eid of extremale determines the value of 
this pm:-ameter. In Figure 7, we let I* T denote the backwards time at which 
u 
the U-singular subarc is entered in V-Phase I. Corresponding to 
which yields the first and second conditions (18) and (25) (with 
;'c I* * * 
I* ,·: 




~ 1) for 
a U-singular subarc \.iith V = 0 at T > T • For O<a<a one uses u V 
* *+ I I * U (T) = 1 for T < T < T and then u*('r) = 0 for T>T . For a>a thP-
V u u 
* U-switching function S (T) never changes sign so that u ( T) = 1 for all u 
* 
T > T • Thus, by manipulation of a, one may fill :i..11 the void in the field of 
V 
extremals in V-Phase I. The resulting field of extremals is shown in Figure?. 
5.2.S. The Case of Negligible Y
1 
Smali Arms Effectiveness. 
It seems appropriate to consider what happens to the solution to the 
problem at hand as the (relative) effectiveness of Y1 (small arms) fire becoMes 
negligible, i.e. as a
11 
+ O. Let us consider (eith~r) Figure 5 (or Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Filled-In Void in Field of Extremals 















~ 0 with the other parameters ~cing held constant, this singular 
"surface" appears higher and higher on the Y/Y- axis in Figure 5. In tile 
limit, the singular surface does not appear in the finite part of the plane. 
Thus, we have shown that an optimal strategy in which a side divides the fire 
~fits supporting weapon system between the enemy's primary (infantry) and 
supporting systems can only occur when thP. enemy's infantry has some fire effec-
tiveness (in the sense of a non-zero Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient) 
against his infantry. 
6. Discussion. 
In this paper we have examined .. i,e dependenct of optimal ..ime-sequential 
fire-support strategies on the form of the combat attrition model by considering 
a differential g;ime (see equations (2)) with slightly different combat dynamics 
than those in the fire-support differential game considered by Kawb~a [22] (see 
equations (1)). For this fire-support differential game (2) we developed first 
order necessary conditions of optimality and constructed "cross-section" pictures 
of the field of extremaJs. By comparing and contrasting the structure of optiffial 
fire-support strategies for our problem (2) with that for Kawara's fire-support 
differential game (1), one begins to understand the n~ture of the dependence of 
optimal strategies on the combat dynamics by also comparing and contrasting the 
combat attrition equations fo· '.:hese two differential games. 
Out· fire-support diffoh~ntial game (2) was similar to I<awara 's problem (1) 
(sec [22]) except that we let the attacker's (i.e. X's) a~tillcry produce 
1" "linear-law" attrition against both the defender's artillery and also his infantry 
and let the defender's infantry produce "linear-law" attrition against the 
attacker's infantry. As contrasted with the optimal time-scqucnMial fire-support 
'For convenience Wl.' usl' the tL'nn "linet1r-law 11 attri•.ion to d, nutc an dttrition 
process in which a targl!t•typt' undl'rgcws attrition nt n rate proportional to the 
product of the nu111bcrs oi f frl'rs c1nd tnq~cts (~H'C' [31], [32 I). 
48 
strategies for Kawara 's problem ( 1) of always concentrating .J l artillery fire 
on first enemy artillery and then later enemy infantry (the timing of the switch 
being force-lE:vel in<lependent), for our problem (2) the optimal st:ategy for one 
combatant (the attacker, X) ~epends directly on the enemy's force levels and 
is no longPr to alw;lys concentrate all fire on either the enemy's primary or 
secondary weapon system. The latter result, moreover, was shown to depend on 
the defender's infantry having some fire effectiveness (in the sense of a non-
zero Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient) against the attacker's infantry. 
The solution to (2) is characterized by the presence of singular surfaces 
(in Issacs' terminology (iee [21]), universal surfaces (see also (18])), a differ-
ent one for each V-phase of battle. When the battle state reaches one of these 
surfaces, X follows an optimal strategy of dividing his arti~lcry fire between 
enemy infantry and artillery in order to avoid "overkill." An,,ther characteristic 
of the optimal fire-support strategies (not present for Kawara's [22] problem (1)) 
is that X's optimal strategy may sometimes depend on v'~ distribution oi 
supporting fires. This behavior occurs on the singular surfaces. In facr:, X 
sometimes must react instantaneously to changes in Y's fire distribution. 
The development of even a partial solution to (2) has involved a solution 
phenomenon not previously reported for Lanchester-type dHferential games: the 
adjoint (or dual) variablest are discontinuous across a manifold of discontinuity 
* * of both U and " This manifold of discontinuity exists for a certain range 
of parameter values in tr.e solution to the problem at hand (2). Furthermore, 
there is a militarj interpretation to this manifold of discontinuity: if Y2 






, then when Y
2 
changes to concentrating 
all fire on Xl' X must re-evaluate the worth of a Y 2 unit bec:1use it now has 
tThe reader should rC>c:tll that these rcpresC>nt the nt.'.lr)',in,lJ ",1lucs of forcC' l\'fl,'S, 
~v i.e. p
2
(t) = a;-(t) where V = V(t,~•X) clc>notL'S :hf' v,lluc• cf the differcntLtl 
game (sec [14], T21]). 
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a direct influence on the payoff. Such a discontinuity in L·.1C" adjoint variables 
is unique to differential games :see !3], (4]) (i.e. it cannot occur for a one-
sided optimal control problem). 
It should also be pointed out that the presence of singular (i.e. universal) 
surfaces in the solution to (2) is apparently independent of the t?rm of the 
criterion functional (here terminal payoff) and depends only on the combat dynamics. 
For purposes of comparison we considered the same payoff as considered by Kawara 
(22]. W~ also showed that the singular (i.e. universal) surfaces can only be 
present in the solution when the defender's infantry Y1 has a nonzero casualty 
producing capability against x1 . 
The problem (2) considered in this paper ~as certain similarities to the 
"War of Attrition and Attack: Second Version" studied by R. Isaacs (see pp. 330-
335 of [21]). We have, however, developed a much more complete ~olution to our 
problem than that given in [:.'1] for Mengel's problem. Although this problem (2) 
possesses some similarities i.l.1 the Lanchester-type optimal control problem 
3tudied by us in [31], its eclution has turned out to be much more complex. Our 
developments in t~is paper, ho~ever, have been significantly helped by intuiti0n 
gained in the study of the simpler, one-sided problem (see [32] for a further 
discussion). 
As a result of our investigation here, we hope that a better understanding 
of optimal fire-support strategies has been developed. As is always the case, 
however, the insights gained into the optimization of combat dynamics fr0m our 
study of the differential game (2) are no more valid than the combat model itself. 
Our work here shows that .he functional forms of the various target-·type casualty 
rates produced by the artillery essentially determinPs the moRt significant aspects 
of the structure of the optimal fire-support strategics. Thus, our study of this 
opti1nization problem shows tlw i111pcrt.rnce of Jeterwining the ..ippropriate (L~t11-'h, .. ,t, 
type) model of combat dynamics, 
so 
---------------- .. ---- -----------
,' 
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